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SCORE MANAGEMENT FOR TOLERATING LATENESS, DRUNKENNESS;
BUREAUCRACY THWARTS DESIGNERS

LYUBERTSY PLANT UNDER FIRE FOR INEFFICIENCY -- Moskovskaya Pravda, 5 Aug 50

The Lyubertsy Agricultural-Machine Building Plant imeni Ukhtomskiy has enjoyed for a number of years the repute of being in the forward ranks of the industry. In 1948 and 1949, the plant increased its output 2½ times and achieved excellent economic indexes. Therefore, it is all the more surprising to view its performance during the first half of 1950. It barely reached the 100-percent mark in respect to gross production and failed to fulfill the plan in regard to commodity production. The release of machines to kolkhozes and sovkhoses showed the following deficits: 1,360 horse plows, 519 reapers, 145 hemp-binding machines, 539 grain bins for self-propelled combines, and large quantities of spare parts.

Asked to explain this failure, Director Mayat and Party Secretary Korotkov of the plant's organization cited the shortage of personnel, increased output assignments, the lowered "labor productivity plan," and the deficient supplies of metals and wood. According to them, the causes are purely "objective."

However, a closer examination reveals that the reasons lie within the plant's mode of operation. To illustrate: in June the plant fulfilled the plan for the first 10-day period only 16 percent; for the second 10-day period, 29 percent; and the third 10-day period, 48.3 percent. If it was able, with existing manpower to complete almost half the plan in one period, it ought to be able to meet the period norm regularly, even with reduced personnel. The solution to the problem is to create the necessary conditions for normal and efficient work.

A recent investigation by the Division of Labor and Wages showed that on one day 213 workers came 5 minutes to an hour late, causing a loss of 71 hours. But even of those who appeared on time, 218 could begin their work only long after the whistle had blown. Some found their working stations unprepared; others failed to find a supply of parts and materials; still others spent a half an hour in line waiting for tools. In the flax puller shop, which is considered the best in the plant, only one-fourth of the machine tools had been started on time; the

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rest began to work only 40 to 90 minutes later. Almost an hour of the shift was wasted in the casting shops. The first conveyer in the forged iron shop, which has 17 moulders, idled 30 minutes because the sand tamping section had not prepared the loam. The fourth and fifth conveyer were not in working order; here, too, the workers wasted 40 minutes. The facts cited herein are not accidental but represent the usual order of things.

Breaches of labor discipline are due primarily to the laxity of managing personnel, which lets the culprits go unpunished. The plant's wall newspaper recently exposed several instances of drunkenness and shirking, but the management did nothing to correct the situation.

The situation is no better in regard to the organization of labor. It is quite apparent that planning in this plant is not what it should be. What is termed a plan is nothing but an official piece of paper which does not oblige anyone to anything. The shop plans are drawn up from a purely arithmetical standpoint, with no account taken of uncompleted production. As a result, the shops begin the monthly program with a hectic effort to complete the "deficits," which comprise 60 to 100 different items.

One of the worst bottlenecks is the forging shop. Its troubles are due mainly to the poor servicing received from the auxiliary shops. For example, the greater part of the equipment in this shop needs careful and thorough repair. When sent to the repair shop, machines are likely to remain there several months at a time; frequently, they break down immediately after their return. The repair brigade in the forging shop, itself, is very weak; it consists of only seven fitters, and they can scarcely keep up with current repairs.

The situation in this shop is even worse in regard to dies. These have no duplicates and are worked until they are worn out. The shop does its best to repair them hastily through its own efforts when they get out of condition, but this is no solution. Inevitably, the dies reduce the amount and quality of the product.

The forge shop processed up to 1,500 tons of metal monthly (not counting hardware). These products are moved by pushcarts, which wind their way along the most devious route because the shop's equipment is not more rationally distributed. For example, the shop processes over 150 tons of a special type of rolled iron in the production of hooked bars. This part requires ten different operations on various machine tools, and in the course of its production travels over 600 meters. The rearrangement of only two machines would decrease the distance to one-sixth.

This shop does not have a single furnace that functions properly. All the furnaces emit smoke and flame. The air intake is inadequate. As a result, much fuel is consumed and the metal does not get sufficient heating. The smiths waste much time waiting for the metal, and even then must work it cold.

The majority of the presses and all the hammers are pneumatic; therefore, the supply of compressed air is of crucial importance. However, at best the air is delivered at a pressure of 4.5 atmospheres instead of the required 6. Often the pressure falls to 3. This situation, too, has been the subject of long discussions, but nothing has ever been done about it.

Similar bottlenecks exist in the forged iron, woodworking, and other shops.

In the forged iron shop, the production of parts gets stalled because the workers are not quick enough to clean the castings in the drums; yet, it would be a simple matter for this plant to make a couple of cleaning drums.

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The plant's management and, in the first instance, Chief Engineer Popov, must be held accountable for the conditions prevailing. They are concerned only with getting through the daily task without insuring continued production in the future. -- S. Gurov

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 Aug 50

At the Lyubertsy Plant imeni Ukhtomskiy, a continuous flow of finished reapers, mowers, and flax pullers come off the conveyer lines. In the flax puller shop, 35 Stakhanovites have already exceeded the Five-Year Plan. One forming brigade alone has turned out 300 mowing machines above plan.

BUREAUCRACY IN THE PLANT THWARTS DESIGNERS -- Tashkent Pravda Vostoka, 27 Jul 50

The following letter appeared in the 27 July 1950 issue of Pravda Vostoka:

At the beginning of 1949, the undersigned submitted a proposal for the improvement of one of the parts of the SKhM-48 cotton-picking machine. Within a month, it was approved by the senior technologist of shop No 1 of the Tashkent Agricultural-Machine Building Plant imeni Voroshilov. Two months later, it was also approved by Murav'yev, the plant's deputy chief designer. Finally, in January 1950, one of the designers of the SKhM-48 informed the writer that his proposal had been accepted for implementation.

However, a month later Murav'yev suddenly changed his mind and informed the undersigned that whole-drawn shafts would be used instead and that his proposal was consequently being dropped. As it turned out, the idea of such shafts was Murav'yev's and had been adopted without sanction from the State Special Design Bureau for Cotton, which, indeed, had rejected the new variant.

Although it has been established that the implementation of the proposal would save the plant 12,000 to 14,000 rubles, the bureaucratic attitude of the various officials concerned has prevented its adoption a year after its submission.

Such bureaucracy has been practiced in regard to other inventors in this plant. For example, Designer Suleyman had proposed that a riveted unit be replaced with one that was whole-cast. Murav'yev rejected the idea. After a while, however, this suggestion was introduced into the production process, under the authorship of Murav'yev. Only through the intervention of the chief engineer of the Main Administration was the prize for this invention, which effects a saving of 200,000 rubles, paid to the original author. -- I. Rishal'

LOW STANDARDS PREVAIL IN KIRGIZ PLANTS -- Moscow Izvestiya, 27 Jul 50

As an example of inadequate effort to raise the level of workmanship in the Kirgiz industrial enterprises, the case of fitter and assemblyman Pavlov in the Frunze Agricultural-Machine Building Plant is cited. This worker designed a special bench for the assembly of machine units in his brigade. Instead of encouraging such initiative on a large scale, Stolyarov, chief of the assembly shop, regards this simply as an individual occurrence. Altogether, this shop gives every sign of inefficiency. It is dust-ridden and machine parts are strewn over the dirty floors.

The labor organization department in the Frunze plant has been turned into a mere statistical bureau. It is staffed with seven persons, yet not one of them, including Kozlov, their chief, makes any attempt to organize competitions or to study the possibilities of Stakhanovite methods.

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REJECTS HIGH IN CHIRCHIKSEL'MASH PLANT -- Tashkent Pravda Vostoka, 5 Aug 50

At the Chirchiksel'mash Plant, the amount of rejects is very great. One of the reasons is the poor work of the Technical Control Division (chief, Yaroshetskiy), which fails to assist the supervising foremen with advice and instructions.

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